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Key Supplier Involvement in IT-Enabled Operations: When Does It Lead to Improved 
Performance? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
As firms continue to invest in IT resources and collaborate with key suppliers, many fail to 
benefit from these activities. Drawing on resource orchestration theory and the relational view of 
interfirm competitive advantage, we examine the contingent relationships among IT resources, 
key supplier involvement, and the focal firm’s performance. Using a multi-informants dataset 
from the manufacturing sector in China, we find that supplier involvement mediates the positive 
effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance only when there is a high level of mutual 
trust and when competitive intensity is low in the focal firm’s environment. In a highly 
competitive environment, however, mutual trust dampens the positive effect of supplier 
involvement on the focal firm’s performance, which reveals the “hidden costs” of interfirm trust. 
In contrast, the direct positive effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance is amplified 
by mutual trust when competitive intensity is high, suggesting that the focal firm will fare better 
without supplier involvement under these conditions. Therefore, key supplier involvement in the 
focal firm’s IT-enabled operations does not always lead to improved performance and its effect 
on performance is contingent on relational and environmental variables.  
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Key Supplier Involvement in IT-Enabled Operations: When Does It Lead to Improved 
Performance? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As the business environment becomes more competitive, firms increasingly look to 
external resources such as key suppliers to build and sustain their competitive advantage (Song 
& Benedetto, 2008; Walter, 2003; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). Supplier involvement entails a close 
collaborative relationship in which the supplier directly participates in the customer’s product 
design and implementation processes such that the supplier’s expertise can be effectively 
integrated (Fossas-Olalla et al., 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2014).  As Ireland et al. (2002) suggest, 
this type of interfirm alliance is becoming the new paradigm of competition rather than the 
stand-alone competition between individual firms. While supplier involvement can enhance the 
focal firm’s competitive advantage by developing collective value-creating resources that the 
focal firm cannot create independently (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), some 
researchers have cautioned against indiscriminant employment of supplier involvement as a 
generic strategy in that many such collaborative efforts failed to deliver intended benefits (Smets 
et al., 2013). In fact, sometimes supplier involvement can even dampen performance (Das et al., 
2006), which may be caused by hampered organizational learning or loss of objectivity 
especially in strong supplier-customer relationships (Jean et al., 2014; Villena et al., 2011).  
A related issue in buyer-seller relationships is the role of information technology (IT). 
While the literature generally posits that employment of IT resources facilitates the development 
of firm-level competitive advantage, research has failed to establish a direct, definitive link 
between IT resources and firm performance (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1998; Lucas, 1999; Santhanam 
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& Hartono, 2003), which suggests that the effects of IT resources on firm performance are more 
likely indirect and context-specific. It has been suggested that the performance outcomes of IT 
resources are a function of the combination of other resources that are complementary with the 
focal resource (Chadwick et al., 2015). Although it is relatively easy to imitate or acquire similar 
IT resources by competing firms, knowledge reconfiguration, creation, and application resulting 
from key supplier involvement are much more socially complex, causally ambiguous, and tacit 
in nature, which becomes very difficult for competitors to imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984). In other 
words, IT resources can provide a platform that enables the focal firm to dynamically deploy and 
reconfigure its resources by effectively learning and integrating the supplier’s knowledge and 
expertise (Fawcett et al., 2011; Wu, Wu, & Si, 2016). From the perspective of resource 
orchestration theory (Sirmon et al., 2011), IT resources provide an efficient means through 
which the focal firm’s own knowledge and expertise can be augmented and combined with the 
key supplier’s skills and technologies by the focal firm’s deliberate strategic choices (e.g., 
supplier involvement). Although scholars have highlighted the importance of interorganizational 
deployment of IT resources (Ragatz et al., 1997; Saeed et al., 2011), it is surprising that very few 
studies have explicitly considered the role of supplier involvement in the IT-enabled 
environment, given the role of IT in connecting the buyer and supplier firms in decision-making 
and operational processes. Therefore, the extent to which the focal firm’s IT resources can be an 
effective tool in integrating the key supplier’s resources in the focal firm’s own operations, 
thereby rendering the focal firm a competitive advantage, remains to be seen. It seems reasonable 
that the power of interfirm resource orchestration can only be harnessed through well-
coordinated interfirm collaborations made efficient by IT technologies. 
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The above review of the IT and supplier involvement literature gives rise to two 
important research questions. First, because IT resources will more likely become a true source 
of competitive advantage when they are used to acquire, accumulate, and bundle complementary 
resources from an exchange partner via interfirm collaboration (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hitt et al., 
2011; Ireland et al., 2002), a logical research question is: To what extent does supplier 
involvement mediate the positive effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance? Second, 
interfirm collaboration such as supplier involvement involves resource sharing, tacit knowledge 
exchange, and interorganizational learning, all of which may expose both exchange partners to 
risks such as partner opportunism and learning races resulting from divergent motivations and 
goals (Ireland et al., 2002). Therefore, a critical boundary condition of the effective supplier 
involvement is interfirm trust (i.e., mutual trust), which may be the most effective means of 
safeguard against partner opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and can facilitate interfirm 
cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). However, research has also uncovered negative, albeit 
unexpected effects of mutual trust on interfirm collaboration where innovation or market 
responsiveness may suffer (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 2008). That is, interfirm trust 
may have its “hidden costs”, although conditions under which such dark side effects of mutual 
trust may outweigh its benefits remain unclear. Because the contingencies of resource-related 
strategic choices (e.g., supplier involvement) are “poorly understood and form a critical future 
research agenda” (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009, p.1375), our second research question responds to this 
call and askes:  Under what conditions will supplier involvement lead to improved performance 
of the focal firm’s IT-enabled operations? 
Drawing on resource orchestration theory (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt et al., 2011; 
Sirmon et al., 2011) and the relational view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer 
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and Singh, 1998), this study proposes a moderated mediation model of IT-enabled supplier 
involvement (Figure 1). Empirical results using a multi- informants dataset collected from the 
manufacturing sector in China provide compelling support for the research framework. In 
particular, we find that supplier involvement partially mediates the positive effect of IT resources 
on the focal firm’s performance, which highlights the value of supplier involvement in the IT-
enabled resource orchestration process. However, supplier involvement is not a “silver bullet” as 
results indicate that mutual trust and competitive intensity in the focal firm’s environment are 
critical boundary conditions. When competitive intensity is low, mutual trust amplifies the 
positive mediation effect of supplier involvement; in contrast, when competitive intensity is high, 
the “hidden costs” of mutual trust may outweigh its benefits, thereby significantly compromising 
the value of supplier involvement. In fact, when both competitive intensity and mutual trust are 
high, the focal firm will actually fare much better without supplier involvement, possibly 
because the focal firm benefits from supplier cooperation while not falling victim to routine 
rigidity and cognitive lock-in typically embedded in closely integrated interfirm operations (Fang 
et al., 2008).   
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. After a review of relevant literature, 
we formulate research hypotheses grounded in resource orchestration theory and the relational 
view of interorganizational competitive advantage. We then describe our research methods and 
report empirical results. We conclude the paper with a discussion of implications to theory and 
practice, limitations of the current study, and future research directions. 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Information technology (IT) resources 
© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
5 
 
Information technology (IT) is a critical organizational resource in cultivating 
strategically important interfirm relationships (Lee & Scott, 2015). While there is no 
unanimously agreed-upon definition, IT resources typically include two interrelated elements: 
(1) IT infrastructure such as computer hardware, software, and communication systems and (2) 
technical and managerial IT skills (Bharadwaj, 2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010; Ryssel et al., 
2004). That is, IT resources include both tangible (e.g., computer equipment) and intangible 
(e.g., skills) dimensions in its operational definition.  
Although it is commonly held that IT resources can improve firm performance, scholars 
have struggled to establish conclusive evidence linking IT resources to superior financial 
performance (Bharadwaj, 2000; Dong et al., 2009; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996). For example, 
while Bharadwaj (2000) reported that firms with high IT-enabled capabilities tend to have 
significantly higher profit ratios, Hitt & Brynjolfsson (1996) discovered a negative relationship 
between IT investment and profitability, yet Ryssel et al. (2004) found that IT deployment had 
no significant effects on value creation in business relationships. Empirically, many firms have 
made substantial investments in IT resources without deriving anticipated benefits (Bharadwaj, 
2000; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). These inconsistent findings are unsettling as they directly 
question the value of IT (Dong et al., 2009; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996).  
Because IT infrastructure can be acquired and duplicated fairly easily by competitors, IT 
investments per se cannot become a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Bharadwaj,  
2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010). According to the resource orchestration theory, the outcomes of a 
resource deployment are determined by how the focal resource is effectively combined with 
other relevant resources in its deployment (Chadwick et al., 2015; Sirmon et al., 2011). That is, 
resources of a focal firm should be structured, bundled, and leveraged with complementary 
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resources, which usually come from a collaborative partner, to maximize value creation and form 
a competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Sirmon et al., 2011). IT-enabled integration 
with a strategically important partner (e.g., key supplier) can turn their complementary 
knowledge and skills into valuable, causally ambiguous, and hard-to-imitate interfirm resources 
and routines. Consistent with this view, researchers have advocated investigating how IT 
resources can be deployed to integrate with other resources in an interorganizational setting, 
which ultimately affects firm performance (Jean et al., 2010; Lee & Scott, 2015; Ryssel et al., 
2004).  
2.2. Supplier involvement 
Firms are increasingly searching for external sources for innovation, value creation, and 
competitive advantage (Walter, 2003; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). Among those external sources, key 
suppliers are recognized as important partners for reducing new product development time, 
improving product quality and service, obtaining access to new technologies and markets, and 
lowering operations costs (Menguc et al., 2014; Yeniyurt et al., 2014).  
Because companies must successfully integrate suppliers’ technologies and skills in order 
to reconfigure their own resources to meet their strategic and operational needs, firms typically 
involve their key suppliers in their product development and operations processes (Das et al., 
2006; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Supplier involvement refers to the extent to which a supplier 
directly participates in the focal firm’s new product development and operations processes (Jean 
et al., 2014). While some research indicated that supplier involvement can enhance the focal 
firm’s innovation, operational and financial performance (Afuah, 2000; Carr & Pearson, 2002; 
Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Menguc et al., 2014), other studies either found no significant 
effects or even reported negative influences of supplier involvement (Rodrigues et al., 2004; 
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Swink et al., 2007; Vereecke & Muylle, 2006). As such, considerable ambiguity remains with 
respect to the effect of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance outcomes (Das et 
al., 2006; Primo & Amundson, 2002). Another outstanding issue regarding supplier involvement 
as a resource-related strategic choice is whether supplier involvement is a universally viable 
strategy or there are contingencies under which it may become ineffective and even 
counterproductive (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), especially when IT resources of the focal firm are 
employed in integrating and routinizing the key supplier’s involvement in the operations process. 
While some researchers have indicated the importance of IT in supplier integration practices 
(Ragatz et al., 1997), few studies have explicitly linked IT resources to supplier involvement in 
affecting firm performance. 
2.3.Interfirm trust 
According to the relational view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), although interfirm linkages (e.g., IT-enabled supplier 
involvement) may be a source of competitive advantage, a critical boundary condition for 
effective collaborative outcomes is interfirm trust (i.e., mutual trust). When alliance partners 
exchange, combine, invest in idiosyncratic assets, or share sensitive information, they may be 
exposed to partner firm opportunism, thereby compromising effective cooperation between 
partners due to perceived risks therein. In the scenario of suppler involvement, for example, the 
supplier may be concerned about making idiosyncratic investments (e.g., dedicated machinery) 
which can be used against it by the buying firm in future negotiations; similarly, the buying firm 
may become vulnerable if the supplier passes the buying firm’s sensitive information (e.g., new 
product technology) along to rival businesses.  
In order to realize the competitive advantage of interfirm collaboration (e.g., supplier 
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involvement), exchange partners must have effective governance mechanisms. Interfirm trust is 
arguably the most effective and least costly means of governance that facilitates complex 
interfirm exchange while minimizing concerns of partner opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
Defined as perceived credibility and benevolence of a target firm, trust has been extensively 
studied in marketing and other disciplines. A large body of research establishes empirically the 
various beneficial outcomes of trust. In an interfirm context, for example, trust was found to 
enhance long-term orientation (Doney and Cannon, 1997), reduce perceived uncertainty and 
facilitate cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). In a meta-analysis, Palmatier et al. (2006) 
confirmed that trust is the single most effective predictor of interfirm cooperation. Mutual trust, 
in particular, where both parties have a high perceived credibility and benevolence of their 
counterpart, functions as an especially powerful safeguarding mechanism that promotes 
information sharing and reduces collaborating firms’ tendency to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors (Fang et al., 2008).  
While the great majority of researchers have investigated the positive effects of trust, 
some have reported negative, albeit counterintuitive effects of trust. For instance, Fang et al. 
(2008) find that high levels of mutual trust may dampen the joint venture’s responsiveness to 
external change. Selnes & Sallis (2003) report that interfirm trust may hamper the effect of 
relational learning on focal firm performance. In a similar vein, Anderson and Jap (2005) suggest 
that high levels of trust among a cohesive group of contractors led to the loss of innovation due 
to the removal of external pressure. These findings suggest the “hidden costs” of high levels of 
interfirm trust, which may be a function of interfirm routine rigidity, cognitive lock-in, and 
complacency in the status quo. While the potential “dark side” of interfirm trust has been noted 
in previous research, conditions under which such hidden costs of interfirm trust may outstrip its 
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benefits remain largely evasive and unexplored. As McEvily et al. (2003, p. 100) insightfully 
point out: “Indeed, little systematic research exists on the downside of trust”.   
3. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses development 
3.1. The role of supplier involvement in IT-enabled operations 
According to resource orchestration theory (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt et al., 2011; 
Sirmon et al., 2011), a limitation of resource-based view (RBV) is that the RBV (Barney, 1991) 
focuses on static resources per se and fails to explicate how resources can be deployed 
dynamically to produce sustainable competitive advantage. A central tenet of the resource 
orchestration theory is that the effect of resource investment on firm performance is mediated by 
managerial actions in selecting, combining, and leveraging complementary resources, which 
often entails gaining access to needed resources from partner firms to exploit opportunities (Hitt 
et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011). That is, “what a firm does with its resources is at least as 
important as which resources it possesses” (Hansen et al., 2004, p. 1280). This is particularly 
relevant in the IT-enabled supply chain context because IT infrastructure and investments can 
easily be duplicated by competitors, which keep IT resources from meeting the RBV criteria of 
being rare, valuable, non-substitutable, and hard-to-imitate firm-specific resources (Bharadwaj, 
2000; Davis & Golicic, 2010). Noteworthy is that resources can extend beyond the focal firm’s 
boundary, which can be integrated in interfirm routines and operations processes (Das et al., 
2006; Lee & Scott, 2015; Petersen et al., 2003). In particular, when IT infrastructure is used to 
integrate the focal firm’s and its key supplier’s resources (e.g., skills and technologies), the 
learning, bundling, and synchronizing process is socially complex, causally ambiguous, and 
imperfectly understood by competitors (Bharadwaj, 2000; Das et al., 2006). Therefore, consistent 
with resource orchestration theory, we argue that IT resources can render sustainable competitive 
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advantage when deployed for integrating key suppliers into the focal firm’s own business 
processes. 
Supplier involvement entails frequent and timely communication between the focal firm 
and the supplier (Perols et al., 2013). The focal firm’s IT resources can greatly improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of supplier involvement, which allows the focal firm to quickly 
gather and interpret data, to routinize collaborative activities with the supplier, and to 
continuously exchange time-critical information and learn from one another (Vanpoucke et al., 
2014). Supplier involvement can in turn improve idea generation and problem-solving 
capabilities, resulting in more cost-efficient production and higher quality products during new 
product design, testing, and commercialization stages (Petersen et al., 2003; Song and Benedetto, 
2008), thereby leading to higher focal firm performance. Supplier involvement may also enhance 
end-user satisfaction as it enables the focal firm to better respond to changing environment 
(Vanpoucke et al., 2014). Therefore, the focal firm can use its IT resources to effectively bundle 
and leverage the supplier’s expertise and resources to create a competitive advantage, which 
subsequently leads to improved performance. We hypothesize: 
H1:  IT resources are positively related to supplier involvement. 
H2: Supplier involvement is positively related to the focal firm’s performance. 
 
IT resources include both physical infrastructure and human elements. Although IT 
infrastructure per se is unlikely to prevent competitive duplications, the technical and managerial 
skills needed to develop, implement, and maintain the IT-enabled organizational routines are 
firm-specific and tacit in nature, are developed over time in a specific context, and are not easily 
observable and replicable by competitors (Davis & Golicic, 2010). That is, the tacit knowledge 
and skills required for running the IT resources can be indeed heterogeneous across competitors, 
which involve significant experiential learning leading to more sustainable competitive 
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advantage (Bharadwaj, 2000). As such, we also expect a direct positive effect of IT resources on 
the focal firm’s performance, in addition to the indirect effect via supplier involvement.  
H3:  IT resources are positively related to the focal firm’s performance. 
 
3.2. Relational moderator: mutual trust  
Supplier involvement is inherently risky for both the focal firm and the supplier because 
they must exchange sensitive information, which can make a firm vulnerable to its exchange 
partner’s opportunism and exploitative behaviors (Jean et al., 2014; Narayanan et al., 2015). The 
relational view of interfirm competitive advantage suggests that the nature of interfirm 
relationships is not only economic but also socially embedded in buyer-seller interactions (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002).  Because interfirm exchange entails unspecified 
obligations and reciprocity, trust–a form of relational governance–is essential for long-term 
stable relationships in alleviating concerns of partner opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Trust 
reflects a firm’s confidence in its exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994). Importantly, trust must be mutual to be most effective, as unreciprocated trust will 
quickly lead to instability or dissolution of the relationship (Smith and Barclay, 1999; Yeniyurt 
et al., 2014). When mutual trust is high, perceived risk of partner opportunism is reduced as both 
parties keep their counterpart’s best interest in mind and refrain from opportunism (Fang et al., 
2008; Yeniyurt et al., 2014), and firms will be more willing to share critical and sensitive 
information with each other (Jap, 1999).  Consequently, we expect a stronger positive association 
of IT resources and supplier involvement when there is a high level of mutual trust between the 
focal firm and its key supplier. 
H4: The positive relationship between IT resources and supplier involvement is stronger 
when mutual trust is high.  
 
We also expect supplier involvement to have a stronger positive impact on the focal 
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firm’s performance when mutual trust is high. Supplier involvement entails frequent and close 
interactions between the focal firm’s and the supplier’s engineers (Perols et al., 2013), where 
mutual trust is the “glue” that holds the collaborative relations together (Yeniyurt et al., 2014). 
Although in general supplier involvement is expected to improve the focal firm’s performance, 
this positive effect will be weaker if mutual trust is lacking, because representatives from one 
company may not have full confidence in the counterpart’s employees’ competence and 
integrity, thereby resisting to adapt their work patterns to accommodate those of their counterpart 
(Fang et al., 2008). In contrast, high mutual trust lends confidence to the exchange partner’s 
competence and reduces fear of exploitation. Consequently,  mutual trust motivates cooperative 
decision-making and a problem-solving orientation, which will lead to greater firm performance 
(Fang et al., 2008; Jap, 1999; Yeniyurt et al., 2014).  
H5: The positive relationship between supplier involvement and the focal firm’s 
performance is stronger when mutual trust is high. 
 
 
  As stated earlier, IT resources are also expected to have a positive direct effect on the 
focal firm’s performance because IT resources can enhance the focal firm’s market-oriented 
competence (Davis & Golicic, 2010). In particular, IT resources enable the focal firm to collect 
market information about end users, suppliers, and competitors (information generation), to 
distribute relevant market information in a timely fashion to members of the organization who 
may use it in decision-making (information dissemination), and to implement appropriate 
strategies by adapting to the constantly changing environment (information use). In order to 
transform this competence into competitive advantage, however, the focal firm needs its key 
supplier’s full cooperation to accommodate the constantly changing downstream demands and 
preferences (Wathne & Heide, 2004). That is, the focal firm cannot successfully tap the full 
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potential of its IT resources without gaining adequate support of its key supplier. With high 
mutual trust, the supplier is more likely to exchange market intelligence, share operations 
information, and respond quickly to the focal firm’s requests, thereby enabling the focal firm to 
improve its process flexibility, which leads to better market responsiveness and performance.   
H6: The positive relationship between IT resources and the focal firm’s performance is 
stronger when mutual trust is high. 
 
3.3. Environmental moderator: competitive intensity  
Competitive intensity refers to the degree of competition the focal firm faces in the 
market (Jaworksi & Kohli, 1993). When competitive intensity is high, companies engage in 
frequent competitive activities such as price reduction and promotional campaigns, thereby 
creating market and demand uncertainty. The implication of high competitive intensity is two-
folded. On the one hand, from the resource orchestration theory’s perspective, using IT 
capabilities to integrate the key supplier’s competence in the focal firm’s operations process can 
create interfirm-specific competitive advantage that wards off intense competitive threat (Hitt et 
al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011), which should motivate IT-enabled supplier involvement. On the 
other hand, however, when competitive intensity is high, supplier involvement in the focal firm’s 
operations becomes riskier for both parties because partner opportunism will prove more 
damaging as competitors can quickly erode market share and profits. Therefore, the relational 
view of the interorganizational competitive advantage would suggest that mutual trust is a 
critical governance mechanism that alleviates the concerns over partner opportunism (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998). That is, high competitive intensity will only motive IT-enabled supplier 
involvement when mutual trust is high because both firms need to have a high level of 
confidence that their counterpart is willing and able to adapt to the competitive environment 
while refraining from self-interest seeking behaviors at the expense of the exchange partner 
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(Adjei et al., 2009). Therefore, when competitive intensity is high, mutual trust is more critical 
for IT-enabled supplier involvement. In contrast, when competitive intensity is low, mutual trust 
becomes less impactful as the perceived risk therein is lower. We expect the following effect: 
H7: There is a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and competitive 
intensity on supplier involvement such that mutual trust strengthens the positive impact 
of IT resources on supplier involvement more when competitive intensity is high than 
when competitive intensity is low.  
 
IT-enabled supplier involvement allows the focal firm to utilize and embed key supplier’s 
resources in its own operations process, which can enhance interfirm relationship predictability 
due to increased coordination and communications via IT resources (Lee et al. 2012). While 
mutual trust may enhance interfirm coordination efficiency due to relational norms, mounting 
evidence also suggests a dark side of trust that can lurk inside otherwise strong relationships 
(Clercq et al., 2009; Fang et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004; Selnes & Sallis, 2003; Villena et al., 
2011). Specifically, a high level of mutual trust has a strong emotional element to it, which can 
discourage exchange partners from having constructive debates and healthy task-related conflicts 
for fear of hurting their counterpart’s feelings. Consequently, high mutual trust may hinder 
interfirm learning due to the groupthink syndrome and the filtering of disparaging viewpoints 
from outsiders (Selnes & Sallis, 2003). That is, mutual trust “prevents, rather than encourages, 
the benefits of task-related disagreements in fostering innovation” (Clercq et al., 2009, p. 293). 
As Villena et al. (2011) insightfully point out, high levels of trust can produce social liability by 
reducing a firm’s flexibility in decision-making due to obligations and reciprocity with the key 
supplier. We argue the extent to which the “bright side” or the “dark side” of high mutual trust 
manifests in IT-enabled supplier involvement depends on competitive intensity.  
IT-enabled interfirm integration enhances relationship stability, which is further 
strengthened by routinized norms and behavioral patterns bred by high interfirm trust (Lee et al. 
© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
15 
 
2012). In an environment where competitive intensity is low, the benefits of high mutual trust 
will likely dominate because there is little need to disrupt and revamp routines. However, when 
competitive intensity is high, routine rigidity and cognitive lock-in bred by high mutual trust can 
impede firm performance. Indeed, resource orchestration theory suggests that the value of stable 
interfirm routines and capabilities quickly diminishes as competitive rivalry intensifies (Sirmon 
et al., 2011). The tendency for mutual trust to create routine rigidity is particularly high in 
interfirm relationships where formal mechanisms and procedures are in place to facilitate partner 
integration (Das et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2008). In supplier involvement, employees of the 
customer and the supplier firms must collectively participate in the formal decision-making 
process and frequently coordinate their activities, which will more likely give rise to routine 
rigidity and relational inertia especially when mutual trust is high (Fang et al., 2008).  
Moreover, high mutual trust may create a cognitive lock-in that isolates bonded parties 
from the outside world because both parties think it unnecessary to adjust established routines 
and procedures, causing poor responsiveness to environmental changes (Anderson & Jap, 2005; 
Fang et al., 2008). The dark side of mutual trust may become more manifest and disruptive in a 
highly competitive market, where mutual trust can significantly reduce the focal firm’s ability 
and speed to adapt to the fast-changing competitive environment. In comparison, a low level of 
competitive intensity is likely to mask the dark side of mutual trust due to little need for swift 
adaptations to counter the competitive moves (Sirmon et al., 2011). 
H8: There is a three-way interactive effect of supplier involvement, mutual trust, and 
competitive intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly 
strengthens the positive impact of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance 
only when competitive intensity is low.  
 
Although high mutual trust may negatively affect the effect of supplier involvement in a 
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highly competitive environment, mutual trust can actually enhance the direct positive effect of IT 
resources on the focal firm’s performance when competitive intensity is high. When the focal 
firm employs its IT resources to facilitate the decision-making and implementation processes 
independent of its key supplier, the supplier is more distal from the focal firm, which 
significantly simplifies the coordination process and thwarts the development of detrimental 
cognitive lock-in and routine rigidity typically found in integrated interfirm relationships (Fang 
et al., 2008). As the environment becomes more competitive, IT resources enable the focal firm 
to effectively generate, disseminate, and analyze market-oriented intelligence (Davis & Golicic, 
2010).  
Still, to act on the IT-enabled market intelligence with high efficiency, the focal firm 
needs the supplier’s full cooperation to implement appropriate product and marketing strategies 
in a timely fashion (Wathne & Heide, 2004). A lack of mutual trust can substantially 
compromise the efficacy of the focal firm’s IT resources in adapting to a highly competitive 
market (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Moreover, suppliers can serve as a source for competitive 
intelligence, a critical resource that can be accessed and utilized by the focal firm to significantly 
improve the focal firm’s market responsiveness (Adjei et al., 2009). However, the focal firm can 
only turn its IT resources into a powerful tool in collecting, disseminating, analyzing, and 
responding to market intelligence when there is a high level of mutual trust between both parties, 
as the supplier is more willing to put its own resources to support the focal firm’s initiative. 
When competitive intensity is low, mutual trust becomes less impactful as the need to collect and 
respond to fast-changing market intelligence is much lower. Therefore, we argue that the benefits 
of mutual trust will likely outweigh its “hidden costs” in a competitive market when IT resources 
are employed without the direct participation of the key supplier in the focal firm’s business 
© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
17 
 
processes. 
H9: There is a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and competitive 
intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly strengthens 
the positive impact of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance only when 
competitive intensity is high. 
 
4. Methods 
4.1. Sample and data collection 
To test our model, we collected data from the manufacturing sector in China. China is an 
appropriate empirical setting since its large manufacturing base accounts for more than a quarter 
of the world’s total manufacturing output and supplier involvement in downstream customers’ 
operations is commonplace (Euromonitor, 2012). The survey instrument was first drafted in 
English and then translated into Chinese according to the established back-translation procedures 
(Brislin, 1980). We conducted in-depth interviews with a small group of sales and procurement 
executives to gain further understanding of the research context, based on which necessary 
modifications to the surveys were made. We collected data from two different informants in each 
firm in an effort to minimize common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
In each firm, one informant identified a key supplier based on the importance and volume of the 
procurement and provided data on IT resources, mutual trust, and supplier involvement 
accordingly, while the other informant reported on firm performance, competitive intensity, and 
product complexity (a covariate that we incorporated in the empirical model). 
We obtained a representative list of 3,000 manufacturing firms from a Chinese 
professional research company, from which we randomly selected 500 firms and contacted the 
top management for their participation; 235 firms agreed to respond and provided useful data via 
face-to-face interviews, for a response rate of 47%. The informants were top-level executives 
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with broad organizational responsibilities in marketing, procurement, operations, and supply 
chain, who had access to firm-level information. These firms in the sample represented industries 
including machinery and metal fabrication, computer and electronics, automobile and parts, 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, among others. Annual firm sales in the past year 
were between 10 million and 4.5 billion RMB yuan (US$1.5 million to 670 million), with a 
median sales revenue of 200 million yuan (US$29 million). The number of employees ranged 
from 30 to more than 100,000, with a median of 1,600.  We compared firm sizes (logarithm of 
sales revenues and number of employees) of the responding and non-responding firms via t-tests 
and found no significant differences, suggesting non-response bias was not likely a problem.  
4.2. Measures 
We assessed IT resources with four items adapted from Davis & Golicic (2010). 
Consistent with the definition of IT resources, these items assess the extent to which the focal 
firm has made investments in IT infrastructure as well as competence of deploying IT resources 
in its operations. Four items were adapted from Primo & Amundson (2002) for measuring 
supplier involvement, which assess the degree to which the focal firm engages its key supplier in 
its product development and operations processes. Mutual trust was measured with four items 
adapted from Jap (1999) assessing the extent of mutual reliability and integrity perceived in the 
relationship as a whole from the focal firm’s perspective. Due to budgetary and other challenges 
in collecting dyadic data from both the manufacturing firms and their key suppliers, we could not 
measure mutual trust by aggregating the scores of both exchange partners, which we 
acknowledge as a caveat when interpreting our results and will discuss this issue again in the 
limitation section. We note, however, if the manufacturing firms had any systematic tendencies 
to inflate or deflate their perceived suppliers’ trust in them, the resultant lower variance in mutual 
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trust would make it much more difficult for us to find significant two-way and three-way 
interactions. The fact that we uncover these interactive effects somewhat alleviated this concern. 
Moreover, this measurement approach appears to be consistent with marketing studies in similar 
contexts (Fang et al., 2008; Jap, 1999), which essentially assessed the extent to which the focal 
firm believes both parties trust each other.  
Competitive intensity was measured with four items from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
evaluating the number of competitors and degree of competitive activities in the focal firm’s 
market. These constructs were measured on 7-point Likert scales (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = 
“strongly agree”). 
We used relative measures of firm performance to overcome the difficulty of comparing 
performances across industries and firms. In accordance with previous research (Slater & Narver 
1994; Vorhies & Morgan, 2005), we assessed firm performance in terms of sales growth, profit 
growth, profitability, and return on investment over the past 3 years. The anchors were 1 = 
“much worse than major competitors” and 7 = “much better than major competitors.”  
Finally, we incorporated two covariates1 when empirically testing the model, namely 
product complexity and firm size, to control for the heterogeneity of firms across industries and 
markets. Product complexity was measured with 2 items adapted from (Fang, 2008) to assess the 
degree to which the product is technologically complex and sophisticated. We measured firm 
size in terms of sales revenue in the previous year, and we took its natural logarithm to remedy 
                                                                 
1 Per a reviewer’s request, we also included other covariates such as industry, firm age, and the firm’s ownership 
structure (state owned, private owned, public traded, collective, foreign, or Sino-foreign joint-venture) in a 
separate regression. The model results are essentially identical. Because there is no change for the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates, we only report results based on these two covariates to save space but 
the aforementioned results of a separate regression model are available upon request. 
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skewness in the data. All multi- item scales, along with their internal consistency estimates are 
presented in Appendix A. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1.Measurement model 
We assessed the measurement model with a confirmatory factor analysis. The 
measurement model with six latent constructs and 22 indicators exhibited acceptable fit: χ2 = 
388.45 (df = 194), RMSEA = .065, NNFI = .95, and CFI = .96. Item loadings were all significant 
and positive on their a priori constructs, and no significant cross-loadings were observed, 
suggesting convergent validity and unidimensionality of the latent constructs (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). In addition, average variance extracted (AVEs) ranged from .57 to .73, and both 
Cronbach’s alphas and composite reliability measures were above .80 for all constructs, 
demonstrating internal reliability (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).  
For discriminant validity, we compared the squared correlations with the AVEs of all 
pairs of latent constructs and found that no squared correlation exceeded the average AVE 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We also conducted a series of Chi-square tests, comparing an 
unconstrained measurement model where the correlation between a pair of constructs was freely 
estimated and a constrained model where the correlation was set to one, and the unconstrained 
model always fit the data significantly better (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).  
Finally, because the data involving IT resources, mutual trust, and supplier involvement 
came from one informant and the second informant reported on firm performance, competitive 
intensity, and product complexity (i.e., single source), there may be a concern of common 
method variance (CMV). We conducted a series of test to assess CMV. First, we used Harman’s 
single factor test through an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) which included all 22 items of the 
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six variables. A clear six-factor structure emerged, which explained 78.02% of the variance. The 
first component explained only 31.17% of the total variance. Second, we compared in SEM the 
hypothesized six factor-model with a one-factor model and a two-factor model (where each 
factor has three variables and represents the corresponding informant who provided data on these 
three variables). The results show that the six-factor model was a much better fit (χ2 = 388.45, df 
= 194) than the single-factor model (χ2 = 2706.02, df = 209) and the two-factor model (χ2 = 
2498.42, df = 208). Third, we followed Williams, Hartman, & Cavazotte (2010) to conduct a 
series of SEM-based tests using a marker variable (i.e., CEO leadership style) approach. Again, 
results indicate that interrelationships among latent variables were not affected by CMV. These 
results, together with the fact that significant two-way and three-way interactions that we found 
in the data cannot be artifacts of CMV (Siemsen et al., 2010), suggest that CMV is not likely an 
issue in our study. 
Therefore, acceptable psychometric properties for all latent constructs were established. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables in the model.  
-- Table 1 about here -- 
5.2.Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis testing was conducted with a series of hierarchical regression models for 
supplier involvement and focal firm’s performance, respectively. In both cases, we entered the 
two control variables first, followed by the main effect variables, and finally, the interaction 
terms. All variables were mean-centered before the interaction terms were computed. Tables 2 
and 3 present the unstandardized regression coefficients, their t-values, and the model R2 
estimates.  
-- Table 2 & 3 about here -- 
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Hypotheses 1-3 predict the indirect and direct effects of IT resources on focal firm’s 
performance via supplier involvement. In particular, H1 proposes that IT resources are positively 
related to supplier involvement. As the Model 3 column of Table 2 shows, the relationship is 
found to be positive and significant (b = .101, p < .05), in support of H1. H2 predicts that 
supplier involvement is positively related to the focal firm’s performance. As the Model 3 
column of Table 3 shows, this hypothesis is supported (b = .330, t = 4.384, p < .01). H3, which 
proposes a positive relationship between IT resources and the focal firm’s performance, is also 
supported (Table 3: b = 1.28, t = 2.146, p < .05). Thus, H1-3 are fully supported, which illustrate 
the partial mediation role of supplier involvement in the focal firm’s IT-enabled operations.  
Hypotheses 4-6 are concerned with two-way interactions involving mutual trust. In 
particular, H4 suggests that the positive relationship between IT resources and supplier 
involvement is stronger when mutual trust is high.  This hypothesis is supported as the 
coefficient (see Table 2) for the IT-trust interaction on supplier involvement is positive and 
significant (b = .118, p < .05). H5, which posits that the positive relationship between supplier 
involvement and focal firm’s performance is stronger when mutual trust is high, is also 
supported given the positive and significant involvement-trust interaction on performance (Table 
3: b = .104, p < .05). Lastly, the positive relationship between IT resources and focal firm’s 
performance is evidently stronger when mutual trust is high (b = .223, p < .01), in support of H6. 
As such, H4-6 are fully supported. 
Hypotheses 7-9 suggest more complex three-way interactive effects. More specifically, 
H7 proposes that mutual trust strengthens the positive impact of IT resources on supplier 
involvement more when competitive intensity is high than when it is low. However, as presented 
in Table 2, the coefficient estimate for the 3-way interaction term is not statistically significant (b 
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= -.015, ns), and therefore this hypothesis is not supported. H8 posits that mutual trust 
significantly strengthens the positive impact of supplier involvement on performance only when 
competitive intensity is low. Table 3 shows a statistically significant coefficient estimate for the 
three-way interaction (b = -.132, p < .01). To help interpret this finding, we plot the simple slope 
graphs in Figure 2 using the unstandardized regression coefficients with one standard deviation 
above and below the mean values of the moderators. The figure shows that when competitive 
intensity is low, the positive supplier involvement-performance relationship is the strongest at 
high level of trust, whereas when competitive intensity is high, the strength of the supplier 
involvement-performance relationship is virtually the same regardless of the level of mutual 
trust. This finding is in complete agreement with the prediction of H8.  
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
Finally, H9 proposes a three-way interactive effect of IT resources, mutual trust, and 
competitive intensity on the focal firm’s performance such that mutual trust significantly 
strengthens the positive impact of IT resources only when competitive intensity is high. 
Consistent with H9, the coefficient estimate for the three-way interaction is positive and 
significant (b = .137, p < .01). The simple slope plots in Figure 3 show that when competitive 
intensity is high, IT resources have a dramatically different relationship with the focal firm’s 
performance across different levels of mutual trust. Specifically, when competitive intensity is 
high, IT resources have the strongest positive effect on the focal firm’s performance when 
mutual trust is high. When mutual trust is low, however, IT resources actually have a negative 
effect on the focal firm’s performance. In contrast, the moderating effects of mutual trust are not 
nearly as pronounced when competitive intensity is low (see Figure 3). Therefore, H9 is fully 
supported. 
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-- Figure 3 about here – 
5.3. Research implications 
While it is a widely held belief that both IT resources and supplier involvement can build 
competitive advantage for the focal firm, empirical results have been inconclusive. Some 
researchers have suggested that IT resources can only provide limited competitive advantage 
because competitors can easily duplicate tangible IT infrastructure (Bharadwaj, 2000; Davis & 
Golicic, 2010). Moreover, few studies have explicitly investigated the role of supplier 
involvement in the IT-enabled operations, although suppliers are being increasingly integrated in 
the buying firms’ operations (Menguc et al., 2014; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). By investigating the 
moderated mediation role of supplier involvement, our study sheds light on two important 
research questions identified in the introduction section: (1) To what extent do IT resources 
create value by integrating the key supplier in the focal firm’s operational processes? (2) Under 
what conditions will supplier involvement lead to improved performance? 
According to resource orchestration theory, firms can build competitive advantage by 
deploying their own resources in combination with other complementary resources that 
maximize the value-creation potential of the focal firm’s resources (Chadwick et al., 2015; Hitt 
et al., 2011; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009). This resource synchronization process requires efficient 
information exchange and utilization that provides a rich interfirm learning context, which 
facilitates the bundling and configuration of complementary resources and skills (Hitt et al., 
2011). Consistent with the resource orchestration theory, our results indicate that the effect of IT 
resources on the focal firm’s performance is not entirely direct but is also indirect via supplier 
involvement. Supplier involvement provides insight, knowledge, skills, and experience the focal 
firm needs in order to improve market performance (Menguc et al., 2014). As engineers from 
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both the focal firm and the key supplier collaborate closely, they engage in a learning process 
that requires immediate and frequent communication for effective resource combination and 
reconfiguration (Perols et al., 2013; Vanpoucke et al., 2014). It is in this context that the focal 
firm’s IT resources can play a critical role in integrating the supplier’s resources by facilitating 
information exchange, analysis, and learning. Moreover, IT resources can enable the 
development of interfirm organizational routines that are context specific, valuable to both firms, 
socially complex, and imperfectly understood by competitors (Chadwick et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the focal firm’s IT resources become more valuable when integrated with the supplier’s 
resources during supplier involvement, which create non-substitutable interfirm synergies that 
lead to superior firm performance (Das et al., 2006).  
Although supplier involvement partially mediates the positive effect of IT resources on 
focal firm’s performance, there are conditions under which the effect of supplier involvement 
may be amplified or mitigated in the IT-enabled environment. According to the relational view 
of interfirm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998), supplier involvement is an interfirm 
behavior that is not only economic but also is socially embedded and relational in nature.  The 
relational view of interfirm exchange considers interfirm relationship as a dynamic process in 
which both parties are expected to carry out reciprocal activities directed toward one another 
(e.g., mutual adaptation) in exchanging valuable resources (Hallen et al., 1991). To the extent 
that IT-enabled supplier involvement entails the sharing of sensitive information, both the focal 
firm and the key supplier may have concerns over potential partner opportunism and exploitative 
behavior, thereby refraining from using IT resources for interfirm communication and resource 
exchange (Das et al., 2006).  
As such, to tap the full potential of IT resources, the focal firm must develop a highly 
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collaborative relationship with the supplier characterized by high mutual trust, which is the 
“glue” that holds collaborative relations together (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002; 
Yeniyurt et al., 2014). As a potent relational governance against opportunism, mutual trust 
enhances both parties’ confidence that their partner is credible and benevolent and will not abuse 
sensitive information exchanged (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Indeed, our results illustrate that the 
positive effect of IT resources on supplier involvement is strengthened when there is a high level 
of mutual trust.  Moreover, we find that supplier involvement has a much stronger positive effect 
on focal firm’s performance when both parties trust each other, because mutual trust effectively 
enhances both parties’ willingness to cooperate (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Palmatier et al., 2006).  
Mutual trust is also found to amplify the direct effect of IT resources on focal firm’s 
performance when the key supplier is not directly involved in the focal firm’s product design and 
operations process. IT resources enable the focal firm to effectively collect, analyze, and 
disseminate market information (Davis & Golicic, 2010). However, to effectively implement 
competitive strategies based on market-based information, the focal firm must have the 
supplier’s full support (Wathne & Heide, 2004). Toward that end, a high level of mutual trust 
can not only motivate the supplier to share competitive information but also effective ly 
coordinate with the focal firm to offer products and services that meet customers’ needs and 
preferences (Adjei et al., 2009).  
Despite the overwhelmingly positive moderation effects of mutual trust in all two-way 
interactions, we find that the “hidden costs” of mutual trust will likely become manifest in 
supplier involvement under high competitive intensity. Conversely, mutual trust amplifies the 
positive direct effect of IT resources on the focal firm’s performance when the supplier is not 
directly involved in the focal firm’s decision-making and operations processes. These opposite 
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findings suggest that supplier involvement will not pay off across all situations and that mutual 
trust is likely a double-edged sword in affecting the relative effects of IT resources vis-à-vis 
supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance.     
Although the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
suggests that mutual trust is a precondition for cooperative activity, the focus on the positive side 
of mutual trust in interfirm relationships tends to “blind us to the considerable downside of trust” 
(McEvily et al., 2003, p. 99). In a similar vein, Villena et al. (2011) warn that trust may at times 
produce social liability because the focal firm may lose flexibility and independence in its 
decision-making. When the focal firm and its supplier work together like a co-entity, high mutual 
trust between them tends to build self-reinforcing routine rigidity, keep both parties from 
exchanging negative information and searching for external information, and create cognitive 
lock-in, all of which may hamper innovation and responsiveness (Clercq et al., 2009; Fang et al., 
2008; Selnes & Sallis, 2003). These “hidden costs” of high mutual trust become much more 
pronounced when the focal firm’s market is highly competitive where competitors make frequent 
changes in their product and/or marketing strategies, which would require interfirm collaboration 
to modify or even abandon established routines (Sirmon et al., 2011). However, mutual trust 
tends to breed routine rigidity and cognitive inertia (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 2008), 
which makes it difficult for the trusting collaborating firms to quickly adapt to the changing 
environment. To the extent that IT integration formalizes predictable interfirm behavioral 
patterns (Lee et al. 2012), high mutual trust can solidify cognitive heuristics embedded in 
supplier involvement leading to systematically biased judgements (McEvily et al., 2003).  
Indeed, our results corroborate this argument by showing that mutual trust significantly weakens 
the positive impact of supplier involvement on the focal firm’s performance when competitive 
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intensity is high.     
In contrast, keeping the supplier at a more distal position (i.e., without supplier 
involvement) when the focal firm’s market is highly competitive proves to be beneficial, 
especially when there is a high level of mutual trust. We argue that when the focal firm is able to 
make independent product design and operational decisions, the bright side of trust is likely to 
overshadow the dark side because interfirm routine rigidity and cognitive lock-in are less likely 
to form; in the meantime, the supplier is responsive and supportive of the focal firm’s initiatives, 
and is willing to make necessary adaptations to accommodate the focal firm’s strategies (Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994). Therefore, IT resources will likely enable the focal firm to adapt more quickly 
and effectively to the changing environment when both parties trust each other.  
5.4.Limitations and future research directions 
Like all other research, our study is subject to some limitations. First, although we 
collected data for predictor and criterion variables from two different informants, they came from 
the same company. A better approach may be to collect longitudinal objective performance data. 
Second, our sample came from the manufacturing sector in China. The extent to which results 
can be replicated in other contexts cannot be assumed without further empirical investigations. 
Third, as we mentioned in the measurment section, the measure of mutual trust was not an 
aggregate score of both the manufacturer’s trust in the supplier and the supplier’s trust in the 
manufacturer. That is, results regarding the moderating role of mutual trust should be interpreted 
with caution. What we essentially measured was the manufacturer’s perceived total dyadic trust 
between itself and the supplier. Because the supplier’s trust was perceived by the manufacturer, 
there could be some systematic upward or downward bias in the manufacturers’ reponses. 
Although this measurement approach has been used by researchers in similar marketing studies 
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(Fang et al. 2008; Jap 1999), future studies should collect dyadic data to allow for a more 
rigorous test for mutual trust. 
Our study also poitns out directions for future research. First, we find that the dark side of 
mutual trust sets in for supplier involvement when competitive intensity is high. The literature 
suggests that the “hidden costs” of trust are due to groupthink, filtering of external information, 
cognitive lock-in, and routine rigidity (Fang et al., 2008; Selnes & Sallis, 2003). Future research 
can explicitly examine these factors as well as potential countermeasures to mitigate their 
negative influence on the efficacy of supplier involvement. Second, in contrast to its negative 
moderation effect on the supplier involvement-performance association in competitive markets, 
mutual trust has a positive moderation effect on the direct IT-performance link. As supplier 
involvement only partially mediates the effect of IT resources on focal firm’s performance, an 
exploration of the full underlying mechanisms would further our understanding of the effects of 
IT resources.  
Moreover, some researchers distinguish interfirm trust from interfirm reliance and 
suggest that the latter may be more influential in deteriming interfirm performance outcomes 
(Jiang et al., 2011)2. Future studies can use reliance as a moderator in IT-enabled supplier 
involvement and compare its effects with those of interfirm trust. Finally, we operationalized 
supplier involvement as a global construt. However, researchers have suggested that the nature 
or content of supplier involvement also matters. For example, supplier involvement can take the 
form of process integration, product integration, or other types of intergation (Perols et al., 2013; 
To, 2016). A supplier can serve mainly as a co-producer or as an information provider during the 
new product design and development process (Fang, 2008). It has yet to be determined whether 
                                                                 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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the relationships in our model will vary when a more refined operationalization of supplier 
involvement is employed. These intriguing questions can only be answered by future research. 
6. Conclusion 
This study makes important contributions to the literature by addressing two research 
questions set forth in the beginning of the paper. First, consistent with the resource orchestration 
theory and the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage, our study finds strong 
evidence that IT resources can have a positive effect on the focal firm’s performance via the 
partial mediation role of supplier involvement. Therefore, it appears that involving the key 
supplier in the focal firm’s operations process using IT resources can create synergistic interfirm 
competitive advantage leading to improved performance. Perhaps more importantly, our research 
also identifies conditions under which the positive effect of supplier involvement may be 
strengthened or compromised. While mutual trust can generally enhance the positive mediation 
effect of supplier involvement when competitive intensity is low, mutual trust can actually render 
supplier involvement an ineffective resource orchestration strategy due to the “hidden costs” of 
mutual trust in highly competitive markets. In a highly competitive environment, the focal firm 
can fare better without involving an otherwise trusting supplier in its operations process, which 
helps dodge the “dark side” while benefiting from the “bright side” of high mutual trust. These 
findings not only enhance our understanding of the contingent role of supplier involvement in 
IT-enabled operations, but also enrich theory building by highlighting some of the contingencies 
in the resource orchestration theory and the relational view of interfirm competitive advantage.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std 
Dev 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. IT resources 4.63 1.08 -      
2. Mutual trust 4.95 .97 .27 -     
3. Competitive intensity 4.62 1.03 .29 .27 -    
4. Supplier involvement 4.88 1.11 .32 .58 .43 -   
5. Focal firm’s 
performance 
5.09 .95 .29 .25 .09 .34 -  
6. Log (annual sales) 12.13 2.03 .13 .13 .17 .01 .04 - 
7. Product complexity 4.45 1.47 -.05 .09 -.09 -.10 -.02 .23 
*Correlations above .12 are significant at .05.   
 
 
Table 2: Moderated effects on supplier involvement 
 Model 1 
(Control Only) 
Model 2  
(Main Effect) 
Model 3 
(Interaction Effect) 
 b t-value b t-value b t-value 
Constant .000 .002 .000 -.001 .039 .718 
Ln(annual sales) .017 .457 -.052 -1.843 -.038 -1.420 
Product complexity -.078 -1.539 -.065 -1.671 -.093 -2.512 
IT resources   .126 2.320 .101 1.873 
Mutual trust   .556 9.211 .532 9.127 
Competitive intensity 
(CI) 
  .290 5.031 .311 5.328 
IT*Trust     .118 1.934 
IT*CI     .010 .199 
Trust*CI     -.288 -5.305 
IT*CI*Trust     -.015 -.421 
R2 .002  .442  .518  
Sig F Change .307  .000  .000  
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Table 3: Moderated effects on focal firm’s performance  
 Model 1 
(Control Only) 
Model 2  
(Main Effect) 
Model 3  
(Interaction Effect) 
 b t-value b t-value b t-value 
Constant .000 .001 .000 .000 -.116 -1.802 
Ln(annual sales) .020 .620 .007 .227 .006 .191 
Product complexity -.016 -.373 .003 .076 -.016 -.384 
IT resources   .191 3.308 .128 2.146 
Mutual trust   .057 .769 .162 2.077 
Competitive intensity 
(CI) 
  -.100 -1.571 -.061 -.881 
IT*Trust     .223 3.330 
IT*CI     -.130 -2.199 
Trust*CI     .064 .889 
IT*CI*Trust     .137 2.473 
Involvement (INV)   .241 3.462 .330 4.384 
INV*Trust     .104 1.794 
INV*CI     -.061 -.838 
INV*CI*Trust     -.132 -2.969 
R2 .002  .164  .266  
Sig F Change .803  .00  .00  
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Appendix A: Multi- item measurement scales 
 
IT resources (α = .87; AVE = .63; ρc = .87)  
1. Our company actively searches out and acquires state-of-the-art information technology. 
2. Our company uses state-of-the-art information technology to communicate and share 
information with the key supplier. 
3. Our company has the knowledge and skills needed to maintain the best information 
technology system. 
4. Our company’s information system enables us to share business data for improving our 
market knowledge across all business units. 
Mutual trust (α = .91; AVE = .73; ρc = .91) 
1. The key supplier and our firm consider each other's interests when problems arise. 
2. The promises the key supplier and our firm make to each other are reliable. 
3. The key supplier and our firm are very honest in dealing with each other. 
4. The key supplier and our firm trust each other. 
Competitive intensity (α = .82; AVE = .57; ρc = .84) 
1. Competition in our industry is cutthroat 
2. Price competition is a hallmark of our industry 
3. One hears of a new competitive move almost every day. 
4. There are many competitors in our target market. 
Supplier involvement (α = .89; AVE = .68; ρc = .89) 
1. Our company has involved the key supplier in our product development process. 
2. The key supplier participates in our product development process. 
3. Our company asks for the key supplier’s input for continuous improvement in our operations. 
4. We work with the key supplier to improve our products and services. 
Focal firm’s performance  (Performance in the past three years) (α = .91; AVE = .71; ρc 
= .91) 
1. Sales growth   
2. Profit growth 
3. Profitability rate 
4. Return of investment (ROI) 
 
Product complexity (α = .91; AVE = .73; ρc = .84) 
1. Our products are technically complicated.  
2. Our products apply advanced/sophisticated technology. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model 
 
 
Figure 2: The moderation effects of mutual trust and competitive intensity on the relationship 
between supplier involvement and focal firm’s performance  
A. Low competitive intensity 
 
B. High competitive intensity 
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Figure 3: The moderation effects of mutual trust and competitive intensity on the relationship 
between IT resources and focal firm’s performance 
A. Low competitive intensity 
 
B. High competitive intensity 
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